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Introduction
Legislation is enacted to achieve certain 
aims. Tax legislation aims to subject 
particular amounts, be they monetary or 
“in-kind”, to taxation. Legislation imposing 
taxation must be clear and unambiguous. 
While this aim is lofty and idealistic, in 
practice, this may not always be the case. 
Words may have a number of meanings 
and lawyers are adept at finding and using 
these ambiguities to their clients’ benefits. 
The Commissioner of Taxation will also try 
to use ambiguities to enhance his position.  
It is a basic rule of interpretation that the 
legislation must enact what parliament 
intended. If the legislation is clear and 
unambiguous, then it must be interpreted 
on the basis of those words providing 
that it accords with the other provisions 
of the Act and can easily be applied to 
that to which it seeks to apply. If, however, 
the clear and unambiguous words do 
not adhere to the intent of the legislation, 
then courts can depart from the literal 
interpretation. This is particularly the case 
if this literal interpretation will result in an 
absurd, capricious or irrational result.
When the words are ambiguous, the 
interpretation of the court will be that which 
will align with the legislative intent of the 
statute. When determining the intent of 
the legislation, the courts will consider the 
mischief which the legislation was intended 
to overcome. For example, fringe benefits 
tax was enacted to ensure that non-cash 
benefits provided by an employer to an 
employee were taxed in the hands of the 
employer. This was to overcome problems 
in earlier legislation which occurred in 
relation to valuation and knowledge of 
the benefit provided to an employee. 
While the law with regard to the use 
of extrinsic materials in statutory 
interpretation appears to be reasonably 
settled, nonetheless, as will be seen from 
the cases reviewed in this article, both the 
taxpayer and the Commissioner of Taxation 
have sought to rely on extrinsic material 
to support a particular interpretation of 
legislation.
In fact, recent cases which have discussed 
the use of extrinsic material have resulted 
in some disparate decisions. The facility to 
use extrinsic material can have significant 
implications for the taxpayer or the 
Commissioner of Taxation. Consequently, 
it is important to understand when it is 
appropriate to use this material. Significant 
costs can be incurred by a taxpayer in 
basing an argument on extrinsic material, 
only to discover that the courts will not 
consider such material. This article will 
review recent cases to see if these rules 
continue to apply and how and when tax 
practitioners can rely on extrinsic material 
to support a stance taken against the 
Commissioner or allow a practitioner 
to dispute the Commissioner’s use of 
such material.
The applicable law – the use of 
extrinsic materials in statutory 
interpretation
As noted in the introduction, the applicable 
law with regard to the use of extrinsic 
materials in statutory interpretation appears 
to be reasonably settled. The courts have 
refused to consider extrinsic material 
when it is considered that the words of the 
legislation were clear or when the result of 
using this material would be unreasonable 
or absurd. In Newcastle City Council v 
GIO General Ltd,1 McHugh J quoted Lord 
Diplock in Jones v Wrotham Park Settled 
Estates,2 who stated three conditions which 
must be met before a court can read words 
into legislation.
(1) the court must know the mischief with 
which the statute was dealing;
(2) the court must be satisfied that, 
by inadvertence, parliament had 
overlooked an eventuality which must 
be dealt with if the purpose of the 
legislation is to be achieved; and
(3) the court must be able to state with 
certainty what words parliament would 
have used to overcome the omission 
if its attention had been drawn to 
the defect.
The above principles can be seen 
in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 
(Cth). Relevantly, s 15AA of the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1901 provides:
“In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, 
a construction that would promote the purpose or 
object underlying the Act (whether that purpose 
or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) 
shall be preferred to a construction that would 
not promote that purpose or object.”
The matter which must be considered 
is what materials can be used when 
determining the intent of the legislation 
when the literal interpretation does not 
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promote the purpose or object underlying 
the Act. In this regard, s 15AB of the 
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 permits the 
use of extrinsic materials to help in the 
interpretation of an Act. It can be used to:
  confirm the meaning of a provision taking 
into account its context and the intent of 
the legislation;
  determine how to interpret a provision 
which is ambiguous or obscure; or
  overcome the problems when the ordinary 
meaning of a word or phrase results in a 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable result. 
Section 15AB thus allows the use of 
extrinsic material but this is not mandated 
on the courts and it is at the discretion of 
the court whether or not such material is 
considered. 
As noted in GHP 104 160 689 Pty Ltd 
and FCT,3 the task of a court or tribunal 
is to construe the legislation as enacted 
by the parliament, and not act on an a 
priori assumption about its purpose. 
In this sense, the foundation principle 
of the applicable law is as stated by 
French CJ and Hayne J in Certain Lloyd’s 
Underwriters Subscribing to Contract 
No IH00AAQS v Cross,4 who refer to 
the statement made by Griffith CJ in 
Richardson v Austin:5
“… there is nothing more dangerous and fallacious 
in interpreting a statute than first of all to assume 
that the legislature had a particular intention, 
and then, having made up one’s mind what that 
intention was, to conclude that intention must 
necessarily be expressed in the statute, and 
proceeding to find it.”
What follows from this is that, in construing 
a statute, the text of any particular section 
must be read and understood as part of 
the statute viewed as a whole.6 In order to 
consider a section in its context, a court 
may be authorised to make reference to 
legislative history and extrinsic materials. 
However, this authorisation is not “at large”. 
In this regard, reference must be made to 
Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross,7 in 
which French CJ and Hayne J, quoting the 
plurality in Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v 
Commissioner of Territory Revenue, stated 
as follows:8
“This Court has stated on many occasions that 
the task of statutory construction must begin 
with a consideration of the text itself. Historical 
considerations and extrinsic materials cannot be 
relied on to displace the clear meaning of the text. 
The language which has actually been employed 
in the text of legislation is the surest guide to 
legislative intention. The meaning of the text may 
require consideration of the context, which includes 
the general purpose and policy of a provision, in 
particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy.” 
Their Honours then added:9
“Determination of the purpose of a statute or of 
particular provisions in a statute may be based 
upon an express statement of purpose in the 
statute itself, inference from its text and structure 
and, where appropriate, reference to extrinsic 
materials. The purpose of a statute resides in its 
text and structure. Determination of a statutory 
purpose neither permits nor requires some 
search for what those who promoted or passed 
the legislation may have had in mind when it 
was enacted. It is important in this respect, as in 
others, to recognise that to speak of legislative 
‘intention’ is to use a metaphor. Use of that 
metaphor must not mislead. ‘[T]he duty of a 
court is to give the words of a statutory provision 
the meaning that the legislature is taken to have 
intended them to have’ (emphasis added). And as 
the plurality went on to say in Project Blue Sky:
 ‘Ordinarily, that meaning (the legal meaning) 
will correspond with the grammatical meaning 
of the provision. But not always. The context of 
the words, the consequences of a literal or 
grammatical construction, the purpose of the 
statute or the canons of construction may 
require the words of a legislative provision to 
be read in a way that does not correspond with 
the literal or grammatical meaning.’”
This has particular relevance where there 
is ambiguity as to the meaning of a defined 
term in a statute. As noted in Esso Australia 
Resources Pty Ltd v FCT,10 the established 
principle is that reference cannot be had 
to the ordinary meaning of words where a 
definition in a statute may give the words 
a meaning different from their ordinary 
meaning. In fact, Keane CJ, Edmonds and 
Perram JJ explained in their judgment in 
Esso that there have been instances in a 
number of English decisions where:11
“… the ‘potency’ of the term defined has 
influenced the construction of the definition. 
In MacDonald (Inspector of Taxes) v Dextra 
Accessories Ltd [2005] UKHL 47; [2005] 
4 All ER 107 Lord Hoffmann said (at [18]):
 ‘… a definition may give the words a meaning 
different from their ordinary meaning. But 
that does not mean that the choice of words 
adopted by Parliament must be wholly ignored. 
If the terms of the definition are ambiguous, 
the choice of the term to be defined may throw 
some light on what they mean.’ [emphasis 
added]
A similar result occurred in Delaney v Staples 
(trading as De Monfort Recruitment) [1992] 1 All 
ER 944 at 947 where Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
construed the statutory definition of wages 
‘bearing in mind the normal meaning of the word’. 
Lord Scott of Foscote, in dissent, did something 
similar with the expression ‘town or village green’ 
in Oxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council 
[2006] UKHL 25; [2006] 2 AC 674 at [82]-[83] 
although it is true that the majority in that appeal 
did not regard the definition as being sufficiently 
ambiguous to permit resort to the term defined.” 
Therefore, only where there is ambiguity 
as to the meaning of a defined term 
in a statute can reference be made 
to the ordinary meaning of a word. 
However, Gleeson CJ noted in XYZ v The 
Commonwealth of Australia12 that there 
are many instances where it is misleading 
to construe a composite phrase simply 
by combining the dictionary meanings of 
its component parts. This principle was 
explained in Sea Shepherd Australia Ltd v 
FCT by Gordon J:13
(1) the task is to construe the language of 
the statute, not individual words;14 and 
(2) the task is not to pull apart a provision, 
or composite phrase within a provision, 
into its constituent words, select one 
meaning, divorced from the context in 
which it appears, and then reassemble 
the provision.15 Indeed, it is rare 
that resort to a dictionary will be of 
assistance in searching for the legal 
meaning of a provision in a statute.16
Consideration of recent cases
Three cases are considered by the authors 
in this article: 
(1)  FCT v Qantas Airways Ltd;17
(2)  Re Ward and FCT;18 and
(3)  GHP 104 160 689 Pty Ltd and FCT.19
These cases were selected for discussion 
because, at first glance, it appears that 
there are conflicting views on when a court 
may have recourse to extrinsic materials 
in order to interpret statutory provisions. 
However, as will be demonstrated, the 
different outcomes in these cases are 
based on a consistent application of the 
applicable law in this area.
FCT v Qantas Airways Ltd
FCT v Qantas Airways Ltd17 concerned 
whether car parking spaces provided 
by Qantas to some members of its staff 
as part of their remuneration was a “car 
parking fringe benefit” as defined in the 
Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 1986 
(Cth) (FBTAA) and therefore whether 
Qantas was liable to pay FBT. The AAT 
concluded that Qantas was liable to pay 
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FBT in respect of the provision of the car 
spaces, apart from those at Canberra 
Airport.
Qantas’ argument that the car parking 
spaces were not a “car parking fringe 
benefit” relied on the exception in 
s 39A(1)(a)(ii) FBTAA that there should be 
a “commercial parking station” within a 
kilometre of the premises at which the 
car spaces were provided. Qantas did 
not dispute that there are commercially 
operated parking stations within a 
kilometre of its premises at each airport 
but submitted that these parking stations 
were not “commercial parking stations” 
because they do not provide car spaces 
to the public in the ordinary course of 
their businesses.
Qantas’ argument was explained by the 
Full Court as follows:20
“Because the public spoken of in the [definition 
of ‘commercial parking station’ in s 136(1)] is 
to be understood as being the public including 
persons commuting between their homes and their 
ordinary places of work and not some broader 
public constituted by anyone using an airport 
parking station; and, because, correspondingly, the 
ordinary business of airport parking stations is the 
provision of parking spaces to air passengers and 
those who might deposit or collect such wayfarers 
at or from airports.”
Therefore, the question turned on the 
meaning of the word “public” in the 
relevant section of the FBTAA. The Full 
Federal Court held that the word “public” 
should be given its ordinary meaning 
and “there is no rationale for imputing 
into the definition a requirement that the 
commercial parking station be one that 
employees of the employer commuting to 
work by car would or could in fact use”.
The Full Court added:21
“It was, therefore, incorrect for the Tribunal to 
seek to ascertain the meaning of the word ‘public’ 
in the definition of ‘commercial parking station’ by 
asking whether employees could, in fact, use the 
posited parking stations. It was not to the point 
that employees do not, in fact, use airport car 
parks nor is it to the point that they are prevented 
from doing so. The significance of the existence 
of a nearby commercial parking station is that it 
signifies the presence of value in the employer’s 
car spaces and not that it provides an alternative 
to the staff.”
The Full Court therefore upheld the AAT’s 
decision and dismissed Qantas’ appeal.
It appears here that there is no need to 
have recourse to extrinsic materials when 
seeking to interpret statutory provisions.
A review of the three points raised by Lord 
Diplock, as applied to the decision in FCT v 
Qantas Airways Ltd, would show that:
(1) the court must know the mischief with 
which the statute was dealing — the 
statute deals with the power to tax a 
benefit provided to employees, the value 
of the benefit arises from the availability 
of public car parking facilities which 
cost above a statutory amount;
(2) the court must be satisfied that by 
inadvertence parliament had overlooked 
an eventuality which must be dealt with 
if the purpose of the legislation is to be 
achieved — there was no inadvertence in 
overlooking an eventuality to achieve the 
purpose of the legislation. The legislation 
stated that the car parks must charge 
above a particular rate and be able to be 
used by members of the public; and
(3) the court must be able to state with 
certainty what words parliament would 
have used to overcome the omission 
if its attention had been drawn to the 
defect. The word public is clear in its 
meaning and does not result in, or 
require, additional definition. 
Contrast the above decision with the AAT 
decision in Re Ward and FCT.18
Re Ward and FCT 
In Re Ward and FCT,18 the AAT ruled that 
it has jurisdiction to review a decision 
by the Commissioner not to make a 
determination to disregard or reallocate 
excess superannuation contributions after 
finding that s 292-465(9)(a) of the Income 
Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) was 
“manifestly absurd”.
The AAT found that the wording of 
s 292-465(9)(a), which provides that a 
person may object only “on the ground that 
you are dissatisfied with a determination 
that you applied for under this section”, 
was “manifestly absurd”. The AAT noted 
that a person would never be dissatisfied if 
the Commissioner made the determination 
that the person asked for. So, if the words 
were given their ordinary meaning, the 
only taxpayers entitled to object could 
not do so, the AAT said. In finding that the 
provisions were manifestly absurd, the 
AAT relied on the powers under the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1901 to use extrinsic 
material, namely, the Superannuation 
Legislation Amendment Bill 2010, to give 
the words their intended meaning.
Reviewing once more the three points 
raised by Lord Diplock, and applying them 
to the decision in Re Ward and FCT, we 
could surmise that:
(1) the court must know the mischief with 
which the statute was dealing. It was 
quite clear in this case that the statute 
had been amended in 2010 to allow the 
taxpayer the option of objecting to a 
determination of the Commissioner. This 
amendment was required following the 
decision in McMennemin and FCT;22
(2) the court must be satisfied that by 
inadvertence parliament had overlooked 
an eventuality which must be dealt with 
if the purpose of the legislation is to be 
achieved. The wording of the amended 
section resulted in a “manifestly 
absurd” result which would preclude a 
taxpayer who was dissatisfied with the 
Commissioner’s decision from objecting 
to that decision; and
(3) the court must be able to state with 
certainty what words parliament would 
have used to overcome the omission 
if its attention had been drawn to the 
defect. Parliament would have inserted 
words to make it clear that there is a 
right of objection for taxpayers who are 
dissatisfied with the Commissioner’s 
determination or the Commissioner’s 
decision not to make a determination. 
Contrast the above decision (again) with 
the AAT decision in GHP 104 160 689 
Pty Ltd and FCT.19
GHP 104 160 689 Pty Ltd and FCT
GHP 104 160 689 Pty Ltd and FCT19 relates 
to disputed entitlements to enhanced tax 
deductibility for R&D expenditure under 
s 73B of the Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1936 (Cth) (ITAA36) claimed by the 
applicant, GHP 104 160 689 Pty Ltd, 
a company previously known as Xstrata 
The matter which must 
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materials can be used 
when determining the 
intent of the legislation 
when the literal 
interpretation does  
not promote the purpose 
or object underlying  
the Act.
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Holdings Pty Ltd prior to the merger of 
Xstrata and the Glencore Group.
In particular, the issue before the tribunal 
was whether certain expenditure was to be 
disallowed deductibility at the rate of 125% 
because it was “feedstock expenditure” 
within the meaning of former s 73B(1) 
ITAA36.
Between 2003 and 2007, the taxpayer 
undertook R&D, conducted by way of 
plant trials, to test various possible 
improvements to its copper and lead 
concentrators and its copper smelter. 
Many of the plant trials ran over several 
months. A “plant trial” refers to R&D 
undertaken by way of testing one or more 
altered integers of a plant under ordinary 
operational conditions to assess the 
changed integers’ impacts on the operation 
of a plant as a whole. 
The taxpayer sought to deduct a 
considerable part of its expenditure 
incurred during those plant trials at the 
premium rate of 125%. For each of the 
relevant tax years, the Commissioner 
disallowed many, but not all, items of 
expenditure claimed to be “research 
and development expenditure” and, as 
such, deductible at the premium rate. The 
taxpayer sought review of these decisions. 
The Commissioner’s principal submission 
was that all of the taxpayer’s relevantly 
disputed expenditure was expenditure 
“incurred by the company in acquiring or 
producing materials or goods to be the 
subject of processing or transformation by 
the company in research and development 
activities” and was thus within the meaning 
that s 73B(1) gives to the term “feedstock 
expenditure” and was therefore not 
deductible at the premium rate. “Feedstock 
expenditure” is expressly excluded from 
the statutory definition of “research and 
development expenditure”. 
“Feedstock expenditure” is defined as 
follows:
“feedstock expenditure, in relation to an eligible 
company, means expenditure incurred by the 
company in acquiring or producing materials 
or goods to be the subject of processing or 
transformation by the company in research and 
development activities, and includes expenditure 
incurred by the company on any energy input 
directly into the processing or transformation.”
The Commissioner’s submission to the 
tribunal was that, when deciding whether 
the disputed expenditure was “incurred 
by the company in acquiring or producing 
materials or goods to be the subject of 
processing or transformation” for the 
purposes of the definition of “feedstock 
expenditure” in s 73B(1), the tribunal could 
have recourse to extrinsic materials in 
seeking to ascertain the relevant meaning 
of the section. Such an approach was not 
contrary to the established principles of 
statutory interpretation.
However, in the tribunal’s view, the text 
of the relevant provisions, read as part of 
s 73B, allowed it to ascertain the meaning 
conveyed by the definition of “feedstock 
expenditure” without any requirement to 
resort to extrinsic materials. 
After analysis of the complex factual 
situation, and application of the law, 
especially in relation to the principles of 
statutory interpretation, in the tribunal’s 
view, the inter-relationship between the 
various definitions within the feedstock 
scheme provided a “statutory lens through 
which the meaning to be attributed to the 
definition of ‘feedstock expenditure’ can be 
viewed and ascertained”. To have resort to 
extrinsic materials in this case would, in the 
tribunal’s view:23
“… impermissibly privilege an a priori assertion of 
policy over the statute’s text. The Tribunal has no 
quarrel with the proposition advanced on behalf of 
the Commissioner that his preferred reading makes 
understandable accounting and taxation sense, 
but the Tribunal’s task is to construe the legislation 
as enacted by the Parliament. It must avoid falling 
into the error of assuming the legislature had a 
particular intention, and then, having made up its 
mind what that intention was, to conclude that 
intention must necessarily be expressed in the 
statute, and proceeding to find it (per French CJ 
and Hayne J in Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v 
Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378).”
Reviewing once more the three points 
raised by Lord Diplock, and applying them 
to the decision in GHP 104 160 689 Pty Ltd 
and FCT, we could surmise that:
(1) the court must know the mischief 
with which the statute was dealing. 
The statute included provisions which 
rolled back some of the provisions 
of the earlier legislation which 
applied to feedstock and government 
recoupments; 
(2) the court must be satisfied that by 
inadvertence parliament had overlooked 
an eventuality which must be dealt with 
if the purpose of the legislation is to 
be achieved. There was a perceived 
imbalance in the previous rules which 
allowed the deduction at the premium 
rate while assessing the income at 
ordinary rates. Parliament reduced 
the R&D benefit which could have 
derived from feedstock expenditure by 
increasing the assessable income of 
a taxpayer by one-third of the relevant 
feedstock amount.
In addition, there was also a 10% 
clawback recoupment tax on any 
R&D benefits which were derived 
from government recoupments. There 
was nothing in the legislation which 
prevented these two provisions applying 
jointly and both increasing assessable 
income and imposing additional tax. 
The result was that a taxpayer could be 
worse off by applying these provisions.
This is patently an absurd result yet 
the wording is quite clear. The tribunal 
considered that none of the extrinsic 
documents referred to by the applicant 
addressed this specific issue of overlap 
causing an “absurd” outcome; and 
(3) the court must be able to state with 
certainty what words parliament would 
have used to overcome the omission 
if its attention had been drawn to the 
defect. The tribunal considered what 
wording might have been needed to 
construe the definition of “feedstock” 
to that which the applicant wanted.24 It 
considered that the degree of re-writing 
was so significant (almost 30 words) as 
to be beyond what is permissible as an 
aspect of statutory interpretation.25
Conclusion 
The cases reviewed in this article have 
shown that both the taxpayer and the 
Commissioner of Taxation have sought 
to rely on extrinsic material to support a 
particular interpretation of legislation. In 
light of the review of these cases, it would 
seem that it would be a rare occurrence 
when a court would be permitted to 
have recourse to extrinsic materials in 
interpreting statutory provisions. It would 
seem even rarer that such would be 
permitted where there is ambiguity in 
relation to a composite phrase, particularly 
where the phrase constitutes a defined 
term in the statute. The authors can 
therefore conclude that the above cases 
demonstrate that the general principles 
(noting in particular the three conditions 
stipulated by Lord Diplock) regarding 
the use of extrinsic materials in statutory 
interpretation of the provisions of taxation 
law are quite settled. There can only 
be recourse to such materials if, as per 
Re Ward, the wording of a particular phrase 
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would lead to a “manifestly absurd” result. 
Thus, the implications for tax practitioners 
in this regard are significant. Since the 
courts will, in most cases, not consider 
the use of extrinsic materials to interpret 
statutory provisions, practitioners should 
consider very carefully before advising a 
client to support a stance taken against 
the Commissioner on the basis that this 
stance is founded on an interpretation 
of statutory provisions, which is reliant 
on the use of extrinsic materials. There 
is thus great potential for a taxpayer to 
embark on costly and, quite possibly, futile 
litigation. In the same vein, it would also 
be incumbent upon the Commissioner 
of Taxation to exercise a great deal of 
caution before deciding to have recourse to 
extrinsic materials to support a particular 
interpretation of statutory provisions. 
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